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Institutional Change and Learning for
Sustainable Development
R.D. Connor and S.R. Dovers
This paper is an interim outcome of Land and Water Australia Project ANU-24 – Implica-
tions for Australian natural resource management of international experiences in institutional
change and reform arising from sustainable development – being undertaken through the Centre
for Resource and Environmental Studies, The Australian National University.
In summary, the aim of the project is to explore operational institutional lessons of relevance to
Australia, gleaned from institutional change in other countries driven by the post-WCED (1987)
and UNCED (1992) policy agenda of sustainable development.  The primary output of the project
is a brief (~20 page) report with a target audience of the NRM policy community, stakeholders and
NGOs, supplemented by explanatory material, background papers, case studies, data bases, etc. as
required. Clearly a review of institutional change around the world over the period 1987-2001
represents a mammoth task, and thus this study must scan widely and then scope more narrowly.
This paper seeks to inform that process, and to do so is organised as follows:
• In Part 1, a conceptual discussion of the nature of ‘institutions’, emphasising the need to under-
stand the broader and interdependent institutional system (policy, organisations, rules, political
traditions);
• In Part 1, a discussion of different types of policy and institutional learning, and of who learns
about policies and institutions;
• In Part 2, thoughts on operationalising the idea of ‘institutional learning’ in the context of this
study, Australia, and sustainable development;
• In Part 2, a discussion of proposed primary criteria for selecting case studies and themes for
closer investigation;
• In Part 2, a set of proposed cases and themes for further investigation, along with a set of options
that are relevant but not favoured.
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Part 1: Conceptions of Institutions and Policy
Learning
1. Introduction
This project, under the LWA Social and
Institutional Research Program, is tasked
with drawing lessons for Australian natural
resource management (NRM) from experi-
ences of other countries in “institutional
reform.”  Underlying this investigation is
the proposition that Australia should be
making a purposeful effort to move to
NRM policies and practice consistent with
the notion of sustainable development and
with commitments made under interna-
tional agreements at, and subsequent to,
the 1992 UNCED conference.
In approaching this broadly defined task,
part one of this paper seeks to provide the
basis for a discussion of the key concepts of
“institutions” and “policy learning.”  This
is intended to assist the project team to
build a set of criteria for the selection of
case studies from which to draw lessons
relevant to Australian NRM.  First we
explore the issue of defining the focus of
our attention – institutions.  It is important
analytically that a shared and well-
understood meaning for the term “institu-
tion” is established at the outset, and that
consistent usage is maintained as much as
possible throughout the project.  We argue
that clear and consistent terminology will
promote a deeper understanding of the
dynamics of institutional systems, which in
turn will produce a more useful selection
and analysis of case studies.
Secondly, as this project is “an exercise in
policy and institutional learning,” some
exploration of what might comprise learn-
ing in this context seems worthwhile.  A
brief summary of ideas from the policy
learning literature is given to bring focus to
the search for case study material.  From
this framework, a focus is developed in the
following sections on what it is we might
attempt to learn about with respect to
institutions for sustainability, and examples
of potential case studies are raised to
prompt discussion.
In addition to serving a systematic selec-
tion of case studies, this section stands in its
own right as a contribution to the discus-
sion and development of conceptions of
institutions and policy learning for
sustainability, and one that we trust will be
of interest to the NRM policy community.
The institutionalisation of the sustain-
ability idea, and its eventual integration as
a fundamental and mainstream principle of
governance, is a long-term project only
recently begun.  Arguably, sustainability
has an inexorable logic, on a plane with
other deep social logics such as democracy,
justice, and human rights.  Inevitably it
seems, these central animating ideas of
modern societies are all intertwined and
inseparable.  Sustainability has yet to attain
the status of its natural partners at national
or global levels.  This will require both
broad normative change and purposive
institutional change.  Now is certainly an
important historical point for humanity
with respect to institutional development,
and one that demands that we attend
closely to the task of better understanding
the substance and the ways of our institu-
tions.
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2. Institutions: Form, Function and Relations
This section of the paper sets out a
framework for the consideration of institu-
tions in the context of the project objectives.
It develops a general conception of institu-
tional systems based on the analytical
definition and explanation of institutions
developed in the New Institutional litera-
ture, and particularly the ideas of Douglass
North (North 1990).  The account given
seeks to reconcile this analytical definition
of institutions with meanings underlying
common usage, reducing apparent conflict
through the view that the need for analysis
forces refinement and precision in defining
the objects of study.  This theoretical work
in turn facilitates clearer understanding of
the commonalities of meaning behind
seemingly disparate common usages.  It
also allows us to develop a systems view of
institutional form and function that will
facilitate a deeper appreciation of how and
why particular institutional arrangements
may be more or less effective at addressing
the problems of sustainability policy.
DEFINING INSTITUTIONS
The term institution has been used in
many ways to refer to a range of different
things.  It is used in everyday language to
refer to entities as seemingly disparate as
banks and insurance companies, a nation’s
constitution, or an older member of the
community reliably seated at the bar of the
local pub.  This broad scope in common
usage of the term has been reflected in the
language of institutionally related theoris-
ing dating back a century.  Most definitions
of institutions are descriptive and encom-
pass a diversity of social entities.  Follow-
ing a period of neglect, institutional theory
has recently undergone a revival through-
out the social sciences (Goodin 1996; March
and Olsen 1984).  References to institutions
and the use of institutional language often
remains vague and, despite a greater
emphasis on analysis, somewhat con-
flictual.  Some of this is a deliberate attempt
to accommodate a range of disciplinary
theoretical perspectives with disparate
traditions, or merely traditions of similar
imprecision, with an associated view that a
restrictive definition would not be helpful
to scholarship.  In recent Australian litera-
ture Henningham (1995), for example,
relies on a dictionary definition originating
in the sixteenth century, describing an
institution as: “an established law, custom,
usage, practice, organisation, or other
element in the political or social life of a
people.”  Dovers (2001) builds on this to
produce a more detailed meaning, but one
that retains the ambiguity of the original,
and summarises this as: “An institution is
an underlying, durable pattern of rules and
behaviour.”
Theoretical work in other areas has led to
attempts to provide a more precise defini-
tion to assist analysis.  However, as fore-
shadowed above, such definitions have
contributed to confusion over how to utilise
the term in a discourse that refers to several
of the differing entities that in various
contexts are called institutions.  A particu-
lar difficulty arises in the distinction of
institutions and organisations.  Where the
term institution is used to refer to an
organisation, those that use it so would not
agree that all organisations could be de-
scribed as institutions.  So a key question
must concern what it is that distinguishes
one type of organisation from another in
this way.  Dovers (2001), for example,
argues that persistence is a feature of
institutions, and therefore an organisation
that persists over time could qualify as an
institution.  However, here we explore a
different approach.
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One of the most widely used theoretical
definitions of institutions is that of
Douglass North (1990):-
Institutions are the rules of the game in a
society or, more formally, are the humanly
devised constraints that shape human in-
teraction.
“They are made up of formal constraints
(e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal
constraints (e.g., norms of behaviour,
conventions, self-imposed codes of con-
duct), and their enforcement characteristics.
Together they define the incentive structure
of societies and specifically economies”
(North 1994).  This definition can be inter-
preted as referring to an institution as being
a single rule (such as that proscribing the
forward pass in rugby, or that prescribing
which side of the road to drive on), but it is
also possible and of considerable utility to
allow a hierarchy of aggregation of indi-
vidual rules.  Thus the set of official formal
rules of a sport can be considered an
institution.
North also proposes the primary purpose
of institutions.
Institutions reduce uncertainty by pro-
viding structure to everyday life.  They are
a guide to human interaction…”
Thus the way others will respond in a
given interaction is made more predictable
by institutions, whether by formal rules of
the road or sport, or through informal
social and cultural norms of behaviour.
This allows us to move through many
interactions with others every day without
having to renegotiate ground rules every
time.
The scope of this view of institutions is
important to appreciate.  It includes all
socially devised rules of governance such
as articles of constitutions, statute and
common law, regulations and by-laws,
policies, legal rulings, contracts, codes of
conduct and honour, and the myriad social
and cultural traditions and norms that
constrain the way individuals and groups
act in social contexts.  This vast array of
constraints and guides to appropriate
behaviour forms an institutional matrix
within which all social actors interact.
North specifically enjoins us to separate
institutions from organisations conceptu-
ally – warning against confusing the rules
of the game with the players.  “The purpose
of the rules,” he explains, “is to define the
way the game is played.  But the objective
of the team within that set of rules is to win
the game – by a combination of skills,
strategy, and coordination; by fair means
and sometimes by foul means” (North
1990).  Thus teams (the organisations) and
their strategies are responses to the rule set,
and are different in kind to the rules them-
selves (the institutions).
North’s conception and definition of
institutions derives from his underlying
purpose in theorising: to explain an eco-
nomic history in which firms (economic
organisations) are primary actors.  This
makes the separation of institutions from
organisations crucial to his analysis, and
the distinction we hold to be well made and
valid.  However, it does present a challenge
to consistency in the institutional language
of a broad and cross-disciplinary public
discussion.
One approach to this problem is to view
North’s definition as an analytical refine-
ment of common usage of the term “insti-
tution,” rather than a departure.  In North’s
model, institutions are environmental
variables set by society that condition
behaviour generally, and therefore the
emergence, form and actions of organisa-
tions.  They do this in combination with
other variables, particularly the purpose
and objectives of actors and organisations,
cost structures and potential benefits, risks
involved in breaking rules and so on,
although these other factors themselves are
all conditioned by, or are direct products of
the broader institutional environment.
General agreement may be had on the
proposition that at least a minimum set of
such rules is essential for orderly and
predictable social life.
Now, some organisations are also essen-
tial for orderly social life as we know it,
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because they provide the essential service
infrastructure required for the degree of
social coordination and assurance neces-
sary to support the level of governance and
economic activity that is the norm in a
particular society.  These services provide
the regularities upon which we build our
social lives.  To this extent they, and the
organisations that deliver them, form part
of the institutional system.  If we attempt to
identify such essential services and their
associated organisational structures, we
find that many of these tend to be referred
to as institutions.  Schools, universities,
hospitals, banks, the key arms of govern-
ment, are all referred to in this way, argua-
bly because they serve to facilitate the
fundamental workings of our society, just
as the basic rules do.  These are expectable
regularities, or norms, in a given social
context.  They provide us with a “normal-
ised” social environment and are entirely
integral to our way of life.
From this perspective, it may also be
appreciated that particular organisational
entities might, for convenience, be substi-
tuted in common parlance and perception
for the system of infrastructure of which
they are merely a delivery point.  Thus
locals are shaken by the closure of a bank
branch or postal agency, not only because
this may require changes in the way they
go about their daily business and the
possible extra costs involved, but because
they regard the branch, and sometimes
even the building, as an institution in its
own right.  Whether the closure of a par-
ticular bank branch represents real erosion
of essential institutional infrastructure is in
part an empirical question, and is certainly
a matter of social discourse.  However, this
is not itself relevant to the task of separat-
ing out the underlying meaning of the use
of the term institution in the current con-
text.
In the context of the advanced western
economies, it is the underlying service
delivered by the infrastructure of institu-
tional systems that is critical, and we have
become increasingly acculturated to
changes in their organisational configura-
tion.  Regulatory reform, including privati-
sation of government owned assets and
government controlled services, has
brought altered modes of delivery that
continue changing with technological and
economic change. These regulatory changes
are the real institutional changes in the
Northian sense of the rules of the game,
rather than the organisational changes
consequent to them.
However, we cannot so easily discard
common usage for an analytical conven-
ience.  Remember that old fella at the bar?
Both he and the bank building on Main
Street are regularities in the socio-physical
environment that are directly analogous to
those produced by rules.  It is this socio-
physical reality that people experience
most directly on a daily basis, and that
represents in the sensorial world the kind
of order and predictability that institutions
as rules bring to behaviour.
It is now becoming clear how the seem-
ingly conflicting notions of institutions as
rules, organisations, or other longstanding
socio-physical phenomena, are related as
social regularities.  The analytical cleavage
emerges when we ask what is cause and
what is effect.  In complex dynamic systems
like human societies, there are few truly
independent variables.  Each social entity,
whether individual, group, organisation,
process, or institution, is interlinked with
many others and bound into the whole, and
these linkages are not arranged in a strict
linear hierarchy.  Hence the relationships
between a rule and the entities (e.g. organi-
sations) acted upon by it are often two-way,
with feedback from the results of the rule
being applied used to modify it so as to
improve future outcomes.
The New Institutional literature makes a
convincing analytical case for “institutions-
as-rules” providing the fundamental
infrastructure of coordinated social action,
and thereby setting the stage for the emer-
gence of other regularities such as organi-
sations.  Some authors have suggested that
the regularities themselves should be
treated as the institutional analytical unit,
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but this seems less helpful than using the
cause of the regularity.  However, the
answer to the question of what is an insti-
tution depends to some extent on why the
question is being asked.  In any case it is
still a work in progress, in that interest in
the issue has undergone a recent resur-
gence and it will take time for the analytical
utility of particular definitions to be dem-
onstrated and accept-ed.  The range of
disciplinary traditions in the use of institu-
tional language is likely to remain quite
broad,1 and hence analytical definitions
such as North’s will not be appropriate in
all discussions.
However, for those engaged in discus-
sions of public policy for sustainability, it
seems that North’s framework provides a
significant clarification in language as a
crucial building block to an improved
analytic theory.  Although founded on a
micro-behavioural model of the bound-
edly-rational actor, the framework views
individual action as fundamentally con-
strained by social choice as expressed in the
institutional system.  This allows more
scope for addressing sustainability con-
cerns through purposive institutional
                                                
1 For an example of the diversity just within sociol-
ogy see Scott 1987, and Goodin 1996 provides an
accessible summary of institutional interests across a
selection of social science disciplines.
development and reform, and for learning
about how to approach this, than do other
views of institutions more concerned with
exploring multiple theoretical perspectives.
However, the bounded rationality caveat is
important in its implications for institu-
tional change.  Herbert Simon (1986)
comments:
If… we accept the proposition that the
knowledge and computational power of the
decisionmaker are severely limited, then we
must distinguish between the real world
and the actor’s perception of it and rea-
soning about it.  That is to say we must
construct a theory (and test it empirically)
of the process of decision.  Our theory
must include not only the reasoning proc-
esses but also the processes that generated
the actor’s subjective representation of the
decision problem, his or her frame.
The implication is that perceptions are
built on cultural norms as well as experi-
ence.  Because humans have limited cogni-
tive capacity and incomplete information,
our judgements of the world are based on
perceptions guided by beliefs – our mental
models.  Cultural beliefs about resources
and environment are difficult to change,
and to an important extent determine both
the demand for institutional change to
support sustainability and the effectiveness
of new rules for a given level of enforce-
ment.
STRUCTURAL LOGIC IN INSTITUTIONS
In the context of the current project, es-
tablishing the distinction between institu-
tions and organisations, and the considera-
tion of cause and effect relations between
these classes of entity, promotes a systems
view of institutions, and of the contribution
that they make to the functioning of soci-
ety.  Institutions are fundamental building
blocks of social systems, providing the
generalised regulatory framework for
socially acceptable behaviour.  Without
institutions-as-rules, social and economic
coordination would not be possible and
social life would be reduced to face to face
negotiations of terms for every interaction.
Even language is an institution, or institu-
tional system, in this view.
The complexity of the general institu-
tional environment can be appreciated
from the consideration of many everyday
activities that require coordination of
individuals.  From the running of the
formal mechanisms of governance such as
parliamentary or court processes to driving
a private car through the city, successful
negotiation of daily tasks is mediated by a
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plethora of socially defined rules, norms
and expectations.  The very purpose of
these rules – reducing uncertainty in
interaction – means that they remain
unchanged for long enough to often be-
come suppressed from conscious consid-
eration.  We do not think constantly about
which side of the road we should be driv-
ing on, or whether to stop for a red light.
However, should the traffic lights go out or
start operating in a random fashion, chaos
soon results.
In the wider institutional environment
there is often a considerable degree of
redundancy in the system, particularly at
higher levels of group decision making
where results, and therefore mistakes, have
far reaching impacts.  The separation of
powers and the notion of checks and
balances in government is an institutional
expression of the principle of redundancy
supporting several subsystems that must
agree to, or at least agree not to veto, policy
proposals for them to succeed.  Having
such multiple parallel institutional chan-
nels has the effect of broadening the range
of views included in policy debates and
tends to increase both their sophistication
and acceptance.  This redundancy built into
governance mechanisms again emphasises
the systems nature of the institutional
matrix.  A hierarchy is evident, but demo-
cratic government is not a rigid single-
headed beast.  It is, rather, a system of
actors and resources whose, sometimes
almost unfathomably, complex relations
and interactions are defined and con-
strained by a large set of institutions-as-
rules.
The concept of policy systems is familiar
enough, and we can directly observe many
of the processes and actors involved in the
formation of policy.  In a broader institu-
tional system model, these can be viewed
as sub-systems, often acting as feedback
loops, as well as producing new or altered
institutions as policy edicts or legislative
change.  Existing institutional settings
prescribe, encourage, or allow certain
organisations and processes to emerge and
develop that consider issues of importance
for government policy.  Through resulting
interactions the facilitating framework may
itself be modified and developed, changing
conditions for further policy work.  In
addition, policy processes result in outputs
that address substantive issues, setting the
rules and parameters for action in the real
world, thus adding new substance and
often complexity to the institutional sys-
tem.
Organisational form in state-run NRM
has traditionally adopted standard de-
partmental bureaucratic modes as a means
of dealing with distinct and separable
sectors of government responsibility.  This
form is based on a hierarchical model of
administration and decision making, an
assumption of discrete issue areas, and is
reproduced by convention (another institu-
tional form).  Such models have been
argued to be particularly inadequate for
environmental policy problems due to
important characteristics such as complex-
ity, uncertainty, and cross-sectoral impacts
(Dovers 1997; Dryzek 1997, discussed
further below), and proposed alternative
models embody different fundamental
principles.
The notion of organisational form and
culture having an embedded rationality is
worth developing briefly.  Popular argu-
ments over what comprises rational action
have become dominated in recent decades
by a single view or form of rationality
based on economic theory.  Here, efficiency
is the key principle upon which rationality
is judged, and its purpose is the maximisa-
tion of a plurality of goals (social welfare)
through the mechanism of individual
utility maximisation.  However, many still
recognise that other rationalities exist based
on different principles of order, and their
own sets of values and goals.  Easily distin-
guishable ones include legal rationality,
political rationality, technical rationality
and social rationalities.
Each form of rationality is supported by
what has been termed a discourse: “a
shared way of apprehending the world.
Embedded in language, it enables those
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who subscribe to it to interpret bits of
information and put them together into
coherent stories or accounts.  Each dis-
course rests on assumptions, judgements,
and contentions that provide the basic
terms for analysis, debates, agreements,
and disagreements…” (Dryzek 1997).  John
Dryzek (1996) sees the discourse as “insti-
tutional software,” interacting with the
hardware of rules, rights, operating proce-
dures, customs and principles.  The system
won’t work without the software, and this
has arguably been demonstrated in at-
tempts to introduce a free market economy
to the former Soviet bloc countries.  Formal
changes were wheeled in, but the informal
systems of understanding that support the
kind of response expected by the reformers
were not widespread and chaos has been
the predominant result.  The discourse
concept is perhaps a more socially devel-
oped version of the Simon-North view of
cultural norms and subjective mental
models of reality.
Standard bureaucratic administration of
environmental and NRM policy, as seen in
many state agencies, has been built on a
pre-existing administrative rationality that
privileges scientific and managerial exper-
tise, and is strictly hierarchical (the Webe-
rian model).  The underlying purpose is to
be able to deal with large and complex
problems facing society by reduction –
breaking them down into sub-problems,
solving each separately, with the process
controlled, and the value of outputs
judged, from the top.  This rationality is
built into the structures and processes of
administration, but it is also (to some
extent) built into the mindset, thought
processes and language (the discourse) of
the occupants of the hierarchy.  Thus both
structure and culture are integral to the
maintenance of administrative rationality.
This approach has worked to deal with
many policy issues arising in complex
developed economies over the past cen-
tury.  However, it seems particularly
inappropriate to sustainability issues due to
several important characterising features,
including the key issues of complexity and
uncertainty (Dryzek 1997).
Over the last four decades, a range of
modifications to the basic model have been
made through the modification of organ-
isational structure – such as the flattening
of management hierarchies – and the
adoption of new practices – such as
stakeholder consultation.  Such changes can
have transformative effects on attitudes,
organisational culture and policy discourse.
However, they can contribute confusion
and conflict, particularly where the changes
are adopted as a means of neutralising
political pressure, rather than in an attempt
to change system dynamics.  This is be-
cause institutional structure has an embed-
ded logic, and a “mix and match” system
may, unthinkingly, embody conflicting
rationalities.
One example of this type of conflict has
been created where an NRM agency, in
responding to stakeholder demand and
policy fashion, has adopted a formalised
consultative structure to advise policy
decision-making.  The implicit structural
logic in this arrangement is at least three-
fold.  It acknowledges that those with a
stake in the outcome:
• Have a right to a voice in decision-
making because they bear the conse-
quences of decisions made under consid-
erable uncertainty;
• Hold local environmental, social and
economic knowledge not available to
agency staff in other ways;
• Will be more likely to accept manage-
ment decisions and comply with subse-
quent rules because they have been part
of the process (ownership).
However in this case, in compliance with
the Weberian expertise-based hierarchical
model of bureaucratic problem solving, the
members of the consultative groups are
selected from stakeholders (by the hierar-
chy) on the basis of “expertise,” and spe-
cifically not as representative of
stakeholders.  This potentially allows
relevant expertise to be defined in a man-
ner convenient to the agency in determin-
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ing which stakeholders will be part of the
process.  Control is maintained.  The
systemic conflict resulting from this clash
of rationalities may well not be recognised
for what it is, at least until there is recogni-
tion that such a thing is possible.  However,
solving actual problems may be made
considerably more difficult, and stake-
holders may become frustrated and fac-
tionalised.  This points to an important
issue in policy learning that will be ex-
plored in a later section – that learning
must involve improved understanding, not
just mimicry.
A systems view of institutions makes it
clear that the specification of new types of
organisation, on its own, is an ad hoc ap-
proach and likely to prove inadequate to
the task of institutionalising sustainability.
It is the rationality, the principles and goals
that organisational form must embody and
implement, that is required to be elaborated
within the institutional system first, along
with a credible commitment from govern-
ment to support it.  This implies sincere
and believable high-level avowals of
principle, and the establishment of prag-
matic policies and ongoing initiatives, with
adequate resources to back them up.  Of
course we cannot start with a blank canvas,
and changing the cultures of existing
organisations to employ a new logic is a
difficult task, precisely because the formal
rules are only part of the institutional
system.  The critical role of informal insti-
tutions such as cultural norms and social
and policy discourses must not be disre-
garded.  Normative change is required at
all levels along with formal institutional
change.  In the case of sustainability, this
suggests directed effort to re-educate
policy-making and implementation agency
staff and stakeholders.
It also suggests that the level at which
sustainability is embedded in the general
institutional system of governance needs to
be raised, perhaps to constitutional level, to
provide some insulation from the rapid
fluctuations of partisan political economy.
For many, it seems a self evident truth that
governance of human societies should
subscribe to the principles of sustainability
at the same level as justice, human rights
and democratic self-determination.  Like
these other foundation social values,
sustainability is an ideal and not something
likely to be fully achieved any time soon.  It
is a matter for ongoing social consideration
at the most serious level, and requires
mechanisms to accumulate experience and
knowledge of decision-making so that
learning may proceed into the far future.
RULES FOR INSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE
The key question that this project seeks
to answer is, in what ways and to what
degree have other nations succeeded in
establishing credible and working institu-
tional instantiations for sustainable NRM,
and how can we learn from them.  In
seeking answers, it is proposed that the
arguments put here be adopted for the
consistent use of institutional language.  In
particular, “institution” should not be used
as a synonym for “organisation.”2 Such
                                                
2 The use of the term “institute” in reference to or
naming a research, teaching, professional or other
usage is of little analytical utility and can be
perceived as a merely rhetorical device,
aimed at imbuing the said organisation
with socially critical relevance.  Some
organisations, as argued above, provide
services that are critical to social function-
ing.  Where these are prescribed directly
through a policy or set of rules, and par-
ticularly where they are part of the machin-
ery of government for policy development
                                                                        
organisation will not be discussed here, other than to
suggest that this is generally intended to convey the
impression of a distinguished, not to say critical
component of the intellectual establishment.
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and delivery, they can accurately be re-
ferred to as part of the “institutional ar-
rangements” with respect to that policy.
“Institutional arrangements” encompasses
the notion of a system of decisions, rules
and agreements that involves structural
links between existing organisations, and
possibly the creation of new organisations,
for the implementation of policy.  The term
refers to the way that the individual rules
are arranged, and the opportunities and
obligations created by those rules among
stakeholders and their organisations in
relation to the policy issue.  Institutional
arrangements form the infrastructure of the
institutional system (or subsystem) and the
venue for the systems dynamics.  Similarly,
“institutional setting” can be used to refer
to the specific institutional environment or
backdrop for an issue, policy or action.
“Institution” should be reserved for rules of
various types and their aggregative units.
Examples of high level formal institu-
tions of governance include constitutions
and legislation, and their provisions.
Sometimes the distinction between institu-
tion and organisation can be difficult to
draw.  For example, Parliament may be
viewed as an organisation, but is, under the
view adopted here, an aggregate institution
or institutional system.  It comprises a set of
rules about how representative government
is to be carried out, organisational units
and processes prescribed by these rules to
enable the institution to function, and a
range of actors with status and rights of
participation also bestowed by the rules.
The elected representatives are not thought
of as belonging to, or being employed by,
the organisation of parliament, but as
actors in an institutional system, independ-
ent and yet bound by a vast array of formal
rules, constraints imposed by party affilia-
tion, and norms of social expectation held
by the electorate.  The Common Law
provides a clear example of an important
aggregate institution, being made up of a
great many individual institutions – princi-
ples, decision rules, protocols, precedents,
and sub-aggregates such as doctrines.
However, the Common Law is only one
component of the broader legal system – an
institutional system of institutions-as-rules,
actors, organisations and processes.
Social and cultural norms and their ag-
gregates tend to be regarded as informal
institutions, whether or not direct sanctions
are applied for breaches of rules.  Informal
institutions can play a critical role in NRM
in interaction with formal rules, as in many
cases the close monitoring of behaviour for
breaches of formal rules is not possible.
The congruence of formal and informal
institutions is therefore an important issue
in policy change for sustainability.  Wisely
handled, with judicious choice of policy
instruments and well-designed processes,
policies driven by urgent ecological im-
peratives but implying social change
should be able to lead compatible norma-
tive change, albeit over time-scales that
may be politically inconvenient.  As North
(1994) has commented:
While the rules may be changed overnight,
the informal norms usually change only
gradually.  Since it is the norms that pro-
vide legitimacy to a set of rules, revolu-
tionary change is never as revolutionary as
its supporters desire, and performance will
be different than anticipated.  And econo-
mies that adopt the formal rules of another
economy will have very different perform-
ance characteristics than the first economy
because of different informal norms and
enforcement.
This last statement is directly relevant to
the notion of the possibility of learning
from other jurisdictions and their institu-
tional settings, and the problem of how to
choose appropriate case studies of institu-
tional innovation for sustainability.  These
issues are addressed in the following
sections.
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3. Policy Relevant Learning
This section of the paper briefly explores
what the learning part of “an exercise in
policy and institutional learning” might be
about.  Four categories of policy relevant
learning are drawn from the literature:
instrumental, government, social, and
political learning.  All of these are relevant
areas from which to draw lessons from the
experience of other jurisdictions with
sustainability and NRM policies.  In addi-
tion, the institutionalisation of learning –
the embedding of purposive learning
mechanisms in the NRM institutional
system – is something that we undoubtedly
need to learn more about.  Hence, in its
search and evaluation of case studies, the
project might look to learn from:
• Examples of instruments used;
• Organisational structures and processes
established;
• New or different social constructions of
problem sets; and
• Strategies used for raising the agenda
status of NRM issues; and, in addition,
the mechanisms built into institutional
arrangements that have promoted
learning and innovation in these areas.
May (1992) proposes that policy related
learning must involve increased under-
standing, not just mimicry – the direct
transfer of a policy from one situation to
another.  It follows that, rather than just
noting that “success” has been attained by
a certain policy in a given context, evalua-
tion in case studies undertaken by this
project must attempt to understand why
the institutional arrangement had the
observed effect in its particular social,
economic, environmental and institutional
context.  Further, it is important for this
project as intermediary in a policy learning
process to identify whom the appropriate
learner might be for each type of lesson.
The characterisation of the four types of
policy related learning described here
include such linkages, and the case studies
will explore this issue further in context.
INSTRUMENTAL LEARNING
Within government departments and
agencies charged with NRM, policy in-
struments are selected and programs
developed to address defined problems
with stated intended outcomes.  Instru-
mental learning concerns improving the
design of such institutional arrangements
to achieve existing policy goals.  Evaluation
of the “success” of particular instruments
with respect to stated goals might be
relatively straightforward if results are
conspicuously positive, but generating
understanding about why and how par-
ticular results were attained in a given
context is more difficult.  May (1992)
champions the view that demonstrating
instrumental learning requires evidence of
increased intelligence and sophistication of
thought.  We must ponder how to assess in
these terms whether this project results in
real learning.  The so called “goal trap” of
policy evaluation must also be kept in
mind: there may be positive (or negative)
outcomes that were wholly unintended,
from which we can learn as much about the
nature of policies and context as from
evaluation in relation to intended out-
comes.  Some policies may fail to achieve
their primary aims, but have unintended
side effects that are just as beneficial, or at
least educational.
Most NRM stakeholders can benefit
through better understanding of how the
use of particular instruments affects social,
economic and ecological outcomes through
interactions with contextual variables.
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Instrument choice may be left to imple-
mentation units within government de-
partments based on their previous experi-
ence with the issues.  Alternatively, where
legislation or regulations are required to
authorise revenue collection, police powers
or enforcement provisions, executive
government and possibly cabinet level
decision-making may be involved.  In some
cases, particular instruments have been
specified in legislation as government
policy (e.g. ITQs in the Commonwealth
Fisheries Management Act 1991).  It is in-
creasingly the case that the norms of the
contemporary NRM policy environment
require wide consultation and some form
of consensus before new policy instruments
are implemented.  This process will be
driven or at least mediated and strongly
affected by the section of the government
department responsible for policy devel-
opment in the area.  Therefore these policy
analysts and managers must be key learn-
ers in instrumental lesson drawing from
outside jurisdictions.  Depending on the
issue, analysts from stakeholder peak
bodies may also be important, as a coalition
for policy change involving the major
industry representative bodies and the
responsible government departments,
sharing a common policy discourse, can be
immensely powerful.
GOVERNMENT LEARNING
Government learning involves some
conceptual overlap with instrumental
learning.  However, government learning
has as its focus the organisational structure
and processes of agencies and delivery
systems, as distinguished from the policy
instruments used.  Where existing depart-
ments are restructured for greater effec-
tiveness or efficiency, independently of
policy change, and continue to utilise the
same set of policy instruments, the distinc-
tion is clear.  However, reorganisation can
be a result of the adoption of new policy
instruments that require special adminis-
trative arrangements.  Bennett and Howlett
(1992) use the same passage from Ether-
edge (1981) as a criterion for judging this
type of learning – “increased intelligence
and sophistication of thought” – used by
May (1992) for instrumental learning.  The
concept of improved structural intelligence
in both instrumental and organisational
design may be of some utility, to the extent
that it can relate organisational logic and
effectiveness to the rationality and dis-
course supporting the policy approach
being implemented.  Structural intelligence
can be said to increase as congruence of
organisational logic and policy rationality
is improved.
It is clear that the key learners for this
category must be senior departmental
bureaucrats and in some cases Government
Ministers.  Reorganisation (like decimation
in the Roman army) is used as a periodical
strategic management tool within many
organisations for reinvigorating functional
units.  This presents regular opportunities
for government learning, and some organi-
sations, no doubt, become structurally
more intelligent as a result.  However, such
learning is attuned to particular manage-
ment objectives, and these do not necessar-
ily include the needs and principles of
sustainability.  Structural models that take
these needs seriously could play a powerful
role in policy related learning at the both
the instrumental and social levels, acting as
effective seeds for wider institutional
change.  This area may be one of the most
fertile for this project if existing studies of
the impacts of departmental restructuring
for sustainability can be found.
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SOCIAL LEARNING
The above two categories of learning are
both about more intelligently effecting
predefined policy goals.  Social learning, by
contrast, involves the recasting of the policy
problematique – the policy problem itself,
the scope of the policy, or policy goals
(May 1992).  Social policy learning there-
fore involves the wider policy network that
participates in modelling and sustaining
the prevailing social construction of the
problem.  The basic building blocks used in
these constructions are (according to May):
• Beliefs about cause and effect;
• Preferences concerning desired policy
outcomes;
• Perceptions of policy targets; and
• Beliefs about the policy ideas that under-
gird policies.
Changes resulting from a new social con-
sensus about one or a combination of these
fundamental aspects of a problem and
therefore the policies in place to address it
comprise social policy learning according
to May.  It is clear how this conception of
problem framing or social construction is
related to the Dryzek’s notion of policy
discourses.  Each discourse has its own
construction of the problem based on
beliefs and preferences for particular
outcomes.  “Social consensus” in the above
statement relates to “dominant discourse”
in Dryzek’s view – the construction of the
problem that actually gets supported in
policy.
Generalised normative change regarding
the environment has an important part to
play in social policy learning as it affects
preferences for outcomes and beliefs about
policy ideas in particular.  Normative
change involves shifts in individual beliefs
and the social consensus over fundamental
values.  Without normative change at some
level social policy learning would be rare.
Normative change can occur in different
ways: through diffusion of ideas and values
from other cultures; conflict between
opposing groups; or persistent deviation
from existing norms by sub-cultures.
Certainly, with respect to environmental
issues, normative change has been rapid
over the past four decades.  Science has
played a large role in informing these
changes, particularly through creation and
modification of models of cause and effect
relationships, and the collection of data on
the state of the environment.  Improved
information has shifted values over pre-
ferred outcomes for the environment, but
the consequent thirst for more information
has exposed pervasive uncertainty with
regard to many issues.  Perhaps one of the
most significant currently incipient norma-
tive changes involves the dethroning of
science and technology as exclusive pro-
viders of solutions to environmental prob-
lems.  This is bringing more attention to
institutional aspects of problem solving,
and hence to the institutional construction
of problem definitions, with a resulting
extension of peer communities and broad-
ening of the range of inputs to policy.
As we have seen in the foregoing discus-
sions, how, and to what extent, belief
systems or worldviews are embedded in
cognitive institutional systems, such as
policy subsystems, and how durable or
adaptable they are is a subject of contempo-
rary theoretical and empirical study.  There
exists a range of conceptual approaches to
the issue with a common language yet to
emerge (e.g. see Apthorpe and Gasper
1996), as we have seen is also the case with
the issue of the nature of institutions
themselves.  However, “problem framing”
is commonly recognised as being of fun-
damental importance, along with the fact
that the framing varies with the worldview
of the problem framers.  This in turn affects
conclusions about what information is
required for policy making and manage-
ment, and therefore what research is
undertaken or funded by agencies.  Walsh
(2001) provides an example of this in her
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case study of the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission, where the dominant
central policy idea (Walsh calls this the
“embedded epistemology”) has been
replaced successively over several decades.
First came conservation (of tuna), then
preservation (of dolphins), and then eco-
system management.  Each successive
central policy goal controlled the research
agenda for the period of its dominance, and
therefore what knowledge was generated
by the agency.  These goals were formu-
lated by an influential “epistemic commu-
nity,” in this case mainly comprising
marine biological scientists.  In other NRM
policy subsystems the originators of new
problem frames may be biological-
ecological or physical scientists, economists
or other social scientists, or they may
originate in integrating processes drawing
on a range of disciplinary and lay inputs.  It
is new framings of the latter type that are
most likely to lead to sustainable policy
pathways.
Through the current project, we might
learn about different social constructions of
a particular common NRM problem, or the
processes through which social learning
has occurred or been promoted in other
jurisdictions.  Instrumental and govern-
ment learning are able to occur at the
agency level without elected politicians
becoming involved in decision-making.
However, social policy learning requires
political decision-makers to either lead
community normative change or to re-
spond to it.  The greatest opportunity for
social policy learning is probably at the
point where elected governments change,
as different ideological values and beliefs
are brought into play, and new administra-
tions introduce and search for policies that
demonstrate leadership and differentiate
them from the prior incumbents.  Circum-
stances where resource issues flare into
overt and politicised social conflicts, or
where resources and their exploitation
systems are in crisis, can also promote a
rethinking of attitudes, ideas, and policies
that have remained stable for extended
periods.  Conflict can bring information
and alternative logics to the attention of
policy makers and the public that can result
in redefined objectives, changed target
groups, and redistributed rights.  The
deeply embedded nature of many of the
values that underpin particular framings of
policy problems means that there is likely
to be a generational aspect to social policy
learning.  Early adopters of new problem
constructions in the sustainability field may
well be younger policy analysts with
specific education and training in NRM and
environmental problems.  However, the
key actors in policy decision-making are
senior bureaucrats, politicians, and eco-
nomic stakeholders, often with long-term
investments in current problem definitions,
and this is part of what makes for stable
institutions.  North (1994) states: “Political
institutions will be stable only if under-
girded by organisations with a stake in
their perpetuation.”  The same may be said
for policies.  Rapid change may be depend-
ent on conflict or political opportunism or
both, otherwise we may need to rely on
long term social normative change.3
                                                
3 This analysis suggests that structural change in
policy agencies (government learning) may promote
social policy learning.  For example, shallow hierar-
chies that support innovative policy cultures,
promote policy entrepreneurs, encourage challenge
of dominant policy discourses, and ongoing theoreti-
cal education of staff.
POLITICAL LEARNING
Political learning involves political actors
constructing more effective strategies for
getting their concerns onto the policy
agenda, countering opposition to their
proposals, and eventually getting their
preferred policies adopted by decision-
makers.  This type of policy oriented
learning occurs within advocacy coalitions,
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composed of people from various organi-
sations who share a set of normative and
causal beliefs (a discourse) and who often
act in concert (Sabatier 1988).  These coali-
tions, in turn, occur within ‘policy subsys-
tems,’ i.e. the interaction of actors from
different agencies and organisations,
politicians, etc., interested in a policy area.
How relevant political learning is to the
current project is a question that requires
further consideration.  This aspect of policy
oriented learning is undoubtedly important
to effecting policy change, even where
substantial normative change has already
taken place.  In the area of environmental
and NRM policy for sustainability, power-
ful advocacy coalitions for defence of status
quo policies may be well entrenched on
some issues.  The question arises as to
whether it is appropriate for this project to
research issues of political strategy and
tactics that may assist policy change.
Investigation of policy change that is
seeking to explain causation in significant
detail, arguably, must attend this issue, as
differences in strategies brought about by
political learning may explain why policy
change occurs in one situation and not in
other similar circumstances.
4. Concluding Comments
Both the above conceptual discussions
offer some insight into the nature of the
policy and institutional systems and struc-
tures that will be the focus of this study as
it attempts to draw lessons from experi-
ences around the world.  There are distinc-
tive synergies between the systems view of
institutions and the policy learning frame-
work, but there are some disjunctions as
well.  The learning framework, in its at-
tempt to separate categories of learning,
under-emphasises the interactions between
the levels, conveying a view of a rather
linear one-way cause and effect process of
policy formulation and subsequent imple-
mentation.  The systems model developed
here, reinforced by standard approaches to
policy analysis structured by models of
policy cycles and subsystems (e.g. Howlett
and Ramesh 1995; Bridgman and Davis
2000), reminds us that life is not that sim-
ple.  For example, whether a particular
policy is sold and/or perceived as a change
of instrument or a reframing of the problem
can depend the political tactics used in the
development of the “policy event.”
The introduction of market instruments
is a case in point.  These are billed in policy
debate as more efficient, with the implica-
tion left unspoken that they are more
efficient at achieving what we are all trying
to achieve anyway.  This can be viewed as
instrumental learning.  However, in many
cases the introduction of the efficiency
objective actually displaces an existing
policy objective of distributional equity.  By
replacing the instrument the policy prob-
lem has been redefined.  This can pass
relatively quietly, or it can blow up into a
confused public debate and protest.  The
introduction of such “instruments” usually
involve legislative change and the creation
of some form of implicit or explicit legal
property right – a fundamental institutional
building block – and may involve the
creation or reorganisation of government
agencies for implementation and admini-
stration.
Thus there appears little hope of clear-cut
and simple categories of policy and institu-
tional initiatives even at the conceptual
level.  In the second part of this paper we
add into this broth the operational ingredi-
ents of the specifics of what it is we wish to
learn about.  This will bring us toward a
richer appreciation of the nature of the
choices we need to make in selecting case
studies, but it seems this issue is set to
become more complex not less.
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PART 2: Operationalising Learning
1. Introduction
The preceding discussion provides a
workable definition of institutions and an
approach to policy and institutional learn-
ing.  The remainder of this paper proposes
avenues for applying this understanding in
the present project, in terms of what Aus-
tralia might wish to learn about, from
where, and through what case studies and
overseas models.
2. Learn About What?
There are several ways in which one
could proceed to learn from other coun-
tries.  One is to seek countries that are
similar and assess their recent experience.
Similarity might be defined socially and
institutionally (western, English-speaking,
liberal democracies, etc) or environmentally
(dry, variable, high biodiversity, extensive
primary production, etc).  The problem
with this approach is that a set of ‘similar’
countries only captures a small and per-
haps inadequate sample of potentially
relevant experience.  Another warning
against it is that it would echo Australia’s
unthinking history of seeking policy and
political lessons only from other White,
English speaking countries.4  However, the
institutional framework prompts us to
think about this in terms of tensions and
trade-offs.  Innovations developed in
similar institutional contexts would have
greater probability of being supported
appropriately, on transfer, by existing legal
and organisational configurations.  How-
ever, mechanisms developed under weak
                                                
4 The most recent example of this has been the
applications of neo-liberal political and neo-classical
economic theory most vigorously in the English-
speaking world (Castles 1989; Bell 1997; Orchard
1998).
institutional systems may be more innova-
tive and resilient, particularly for issues
requiring local action, precisely because
there is little external support for enforce-
ment of rules.
Another approach would be to identify
the substantive issues most high on Aus-
tralia’s domestic agenda and then scan the
world for examples of institutional re-
sponses to those (for example, water
allocation, dryland salinity, off-reserve
biodiversity conservation, and so on).  This
would run the risk of only focusing on
issues of the moment, of not being open to
cross-issue relevance of particular institu-
tional strategies, and of reducing the field
of study back to a collection of discrete
issues rather than a (possibly) integrated
suite of issues.  On the other hand it may
produce some immediately applicable
lessons for current problems.
However, this project seeks to learn from
overseas examples of institutional reform
and change in the policy field of sustainable
development (SD), not necessarily with
regard to particular issues that make up
that agenda.  To do so, it would need to be
established what sustainable development
means, or at least a reasonably widely
accepted Australian version of what we
think it means.
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THE MEANING OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Although a highly contestable term,
sustainable development is expressed in
Australia as principles of ecologically
sustainable development, or ESD principles
(see Box 1). These were developed as part
of Australia’s response to the emerging
global policy agenda of SD in the early
1990s, reflect international discussions and
instruments, are sufficiently broad to cover
most aspects of SD, and have been ex-
pressed in many hundreds of Australian
policies and over 120 Australian laws
(Dovers 1999; Stein 2000).  Thus, ESD
principles should encapsulate much of
what Australia might wish to learn about
institutionalising SD: that is, if ESD is
where we think we want to go, then ESD
can logically also describe what we need to
learn about to get there.  Pursuing the
institutionalisation of ‘official’ policy goals
and principles in this way has the added
advantage of providing additional strength
to any lessons drawn, as opposed to lessons
drawn from statements of the problem that
do not reflect widespread consensus at
government level.
As stated in policy and law, though, ESD
principles are summary, vague and not
particularly instructive in institutional
terms (although they are more so in policy
terms).  This is not surprising, as they were
compromise and summary statements,
conveniently stated during a short-term
political process.  However, they do reflect
much of the nature of sustainability as a
suite of research and policy problems, for
example in the following iteration of the
attributes of sustainability problems (from
Dovers 1997):
• deepened and variable temporal scales;
• broadened and variable spatial scales;
• possible ecological limits to human
activities;
• often, irreversible and/or cumulative
impacts;
• complexity within problems, and con-
nectivity between problems;
• pervasive risk and uncertainty;
• poor information base for many proc-
esses;
• important assets not traded and thus not
valued economically;
• new ethical dimensions (rights of other
species, future generations);
• systemic problem causes, rooted in
patterns of production and consumption,
settlement and governance;
• insufficiently developed and/or con-
tested theories, methods, techniques;
• poorly defined policy and property
rights and responsibilities; .
• public/private costs and benefits difficult
to separate;
• demands and justification for broad
community participation in policy dis-
cussion and formulation;
• sheer novelty as a recently defined policy
field.
These problem attributes, especially
when encountered in combination, give
some meaning and tractability to the
widespread perception and common claim
that sustainability problems are particu-
larly difficult.  They also reconfirm some of
the targets of learning that flow from ESD
principles (Box 1).
These attributes, and the discussion of
learning above, can inform a restatement of
ESD goals and principles into a more
operational statement of ‘what we want to
learn about’. Box 1 adds to the National
Strategy for ESD (Australia 1992) iteration
of goals and principles summary comments
that define learning targets that would
appear to logically flow from those princi-
ples, and from the generic attributes of ESD
problems, in terms of learning as that
concept is constructed earlier in his paper.
Also in Box 1 are summary descriptors of
each goal and principle for efficient use
elsewhere in this paper.
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Box 1: ESD Principles as Targets for Policy and Institutional Learning
ESD Goals, Objectives and
Principles5
Summary
Descriptor
Core Meaning as Target for Learning
Goal: Development that
improves the total quality of
life, both now and in the
future, in a way that maintains
the ecological processes on
which life depends.
Goal. Too general – see under objectives and
principles below.
Objectives:
1: To enhance individual and
community well-being and
welfare by following a path of
economic development that
safeguards the welfare of
future generations.
Sustainable
economic
development.
Policy processes and institutional ar-
rangements that ensure longer considera-
tions in economic policy and planning,
and the implications of economic policy
for individual and community well-being
(well-being defined in broad terms,
including social, cultural, environmental
and economic aspects).
2: To provide for equity within
and between generations.
Inter- and intra-
generational
equity.
Policy processes and institutional ar-
rangements explicitly targeting the issue
of the multiple dimensions of equity over
the long term.
3: To protect biological diver-
sity and maintain essential
ecological processes and life
support systems.
Biodiversity and
ecological
processes.
Policy processes and institutional ar-
rangements that elevate the importance of
biodiversity and ecological processes as
matters of policy concern and as social
and policy goals, across policy sectors.
Principles:
1: Decision making processes
should effectively integrate
both long and short term
economic, environmental,
social and equity dimensions.
Integration. Processes and arrangements that seek to
integrate, encourage or demand policy
integration, or research and develop
methods for such integration.
2: Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason
for postponing measures to
prevent environmental
degradation.
Precautionary
Principle.
Processes and arrangements that explic-
itly inform decisions in the face of uncer-
tainty, ensure consideration of risk and
uncertainty, seek to enhance the informa-
tion base for decision making in the long
term, or research and develop approaches
for so doing.
3: The global dimension of
environmental impacts of
actions and policies should be
International
Commons policy.
Processes and arrangements that account
for, seek to account for, or seek to estab-
lish the nature of international threats to
                                                
5 From Australia, The Commonwealth. 1992. National strategy for ecologically sustainable development. Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service.
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recognised and considered. sustainability or opportunities for im-
proving prospects for sustainability
through international coordination of
policy and action.
4: The need to develop a
strong, growing and diversi-
fied economy which can
enhance the capacity for
environmental protection
should be recognised.6
Sustainable
economic growth.
Processes and arrangements that explic-
itly seek to link economic growth with
environment or to establish whether such
links can or do exist.
5: The need to maintain and
enhance international com-
petitiveness in an environ-
mentally sound manner
should be recognised.
International
competitiveness.
Processes and arrangements aimed at
explicating, reviewing and/or ensuring
the environmental (and social) benefits, or
avoiding the disbenefits, of international
law, trade, policy and interactions.
6: Cost effective and flexible
policy instruments should be
adopted, such as improved
valuation, pricing and incen-
tive mechanisms.
Policy instrument
choice.
Applications of flexible policy instru-
ments, and/or processes and arrange-
ments to research, monitor, select and test
new approaches to policy instrument
choice and application (including but not
only market mechanisms as implied in the
principle).
7: Decisions and actions
should provide for broad
community involvement on
issues which affect them.
Community
involvement.
Processes and arrangements that allow or
encourage community participation in
policy debate, policy formulation and
management.
                                                
6 This is a central and contested proposal in the sustainability literature; ie. that environmental protection
depends on economic growth (for a review, see van den Bergh and de Mooij 1999).  Here, the object of learning
that arises is defined not around belief or disbelief in this proposal, but rather in terms of policy and institu-
tional settings aimed at either establishing such a link in practice, or further testing the proposition.
In Box 1, all targets for learning are
stated in term of policy processes and
institutional arrangements, and framed in a
broad manner including policy and institu-
tional responses that fulfil, aim to fulfil, or
research and develop approaches for
fulfilling that objective or principle or part
thereof. Such responses may include
sustained (as opposed to superficial) policy
programs, organisational restructuring
such as portfolio re-arrangements, creation
of new agencies, information-based initia-
tives, or deeper institutional change such as
statutory or constitutional reform.  An
integrated and concerted institutional and
policy response to all ESD objectives and
principles is arguably not evident in any
country, but would equal a rather fulsome
and impressive response to the intellectual
and policy agenda constructed between
1987 and 1992.  In these terms, this transla-
tion of ESD principles into (albeit broadly
framed) targets for policy and institutional
learning constructs what may be regarded
as an already sufficiently large canvas for
this study. With respect to kinds of learning
discussed earlier, most possibilities are
embedded in the targets in Box 1, although
perhaps with a less explicit emphasis on
political learning.
The principles of ESD adopted by Aus-
tralia (Box 1) strongly reflect the economic
growth element of the Bruntland construc-
tion of sustainable development.  One
critical reading of Bruntland is that the
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WCED emphasis on growth as the answer
to global maldistribution was the only
approach that could succeed in gaining
broad consideration of and consensus on
the other central issues of sustainability.
Australia’s ESD principles enthusiastically
restate this approach, emphasising strong
growth and international competitiveness
as sustainability goals, and incentive and
signalling (economic) instruments as
means.  With time this may come to be seen
more widely as an overemphasis produced
by transient political conditions and policy
fashion – given that three of the seven
principles are given over to economics.
However, there are things missing from
the NSESD version of sustainability that
emerge when actual policy and institu-
tional responses in Australia and elsewhere
are considered. The following section
reviews such directions of reform. Further,
consideration of the most complete and
consensus-derived global statement of
intent regarding sustainability, the 1992 Rio
Declaration, adds other, significant agendas
for policy and institutional reform. For
example, principles 5-6 of the Declaration
emphasise poverty reduction and prioritise
the needs of least developed countries,
while principle 11 states the need for
effective national legislation and standards.
Principles 20-22 elevate the views and
involvement in sustainability of women,
youth and indigenous and local people.
Consideration of such principles in a study
like this is important given their status as
internationally agreed goals, and given that
they have been expressed explicitly and
thus may have informed the policy and
institutional reform agendas of other
nations.
THUS FAR IN AUSTRALIA …
If ESD principles represent the policy
challenge agreed to by Australian govern-
ments and major interest groups, it is
relevant here to consider the style of re-
sponse to that challenge thus far. This
section characterises the style of policy
response, not in terms of the efficacy or
adequacy of the response but rather the
policy and institutional directions that the
country has chosen.7  The following at-
tempts to roughly categorise the policy and
institutional baskets into which Australia
has placed the bulk of its ESD eggs:8
• Community-based programs such as
landcare, waterwatch, etc, with an empha-
sis on on-ground coordination and works
                                                
7 Reviews of the both the kinds of reforms and their
adequacy can be found in Productivity Commission
1999; Yencken and Wilkinson 2000; Dovers 1999,
2001b; and in the forthcoming 2001 Commonwealth
state of environment report.
8 Overviews and assessments of most of these
categories are available in specific studies contained
in Dovers and Wild River 2001.
and to a lesser extent monitoring, relying to
varying degrees on a mixture of volunteer-
ism and government financial and other
support;
• Integrated catchment management,
through informal cooperative initiatives
and more formally structured creation of
new administrative and statutory arrange-
ments;
• Often less formally structured or sup-
ported regional planning initiatives, often
explicitly seeking to integrate economic,
social and environmental concerns through
long term planning involving community
participation or leadership;9
(The last three above are often the deliv-
ery mechanisms for government-financed
policy programs, such as the National
Heritage Trust and the National Salinity
and Water Quality Action Plan.)
                                                
9 For examples see Dore and Woodhill 1999.
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• Information-based processes (for exam-
ple state of environment reporting, natural
resource accounting, land and water audits,
etc.);10
• The application of economic instruments
and market mechanisms of various kinds
(incentive and signalling approaches),
including tradable emission permits,
salinity credits, rights markets in fish and
water, levies, and so on (noting that the
advocacy of such instruments has exceeded
their practical application thus far);
• Self-regulatory approaches (codes of
practice, corporate reporting, etc) in various
industry sectors, usually developed coop-
eratively between government and the
private sector;
• Development or maintenance of inter-
governmental arrangements of various
kinds, such as the MDB Initiative, man-
agement of the Great Barrier Reef, coop-
erative arrangements for management of
the Australian Alps, ministerial councils,
etc;
• (Limited) moves toward co-management
arrangements with indigenous people,
including major conservation reserves and
the more recent Indigenous Protected
Areas program;
• (Variable) domestic engagement in the
formulation and implementation of inter-
national instruments dealing with major
resource and environmental issues;
• Sectoral and issue-based policy devel-
opment, with associated programs (oceans,
forestry, biodiversity, greenhouse, land-
care, coasts, etc).  Of all sectoral policy
initiatives, the RFA process has been by far
the largest and most comprehensive.  Most
major sectoral11 policies have been devel-
                                                
10 See Venning and Higgins 2001.
11 Note that some of these policy initiatives, and
Oceans Policy in particular, cut across traditional
sectors (fishing, coastal management, shipping,
marine conservation) and are attempts at integration
over the broader sustainability policy concerns, using
ecological rather than economic parameters as
primary criteria for defining the policy sector.
oped cooperatively by the Commonwealth
and the sates/territories (and less often
with local government);
• Some significant specific institutional
reforms, such as the creation of the (now
defunct) Resource Assessment Commission
and the proposed Victorian Commissioner
for ESD;
• Experiments in the arrangement of
resource and environment portfolio at state
and Commonwealth level, where various
constellations of resources, lands, agricul-
ture, environment and conservation have
been constructed (and often deconstructed).
While not an apparent or explicit ESD-
related policy, this is of interest given the
question of where in the public policy
landscape environment and resource issues
should be located.  At state/territory level,
some of the experiments seem purposeful
in ESD policy terms, whereas at the Com-
monwealth level the portfolio changes
appear to have be driven by other impera-
tives;
• Research and development programs
(and sometimes actual agencies) in the
resource and environmental fields.
A feature of the early ESD era in Austra-
lia, consensus policy development organ-
ised along so-called corporatist lines (using
major representative groups to formulate
policy), has been less evident in the second
half of the 1990s.  Also less prominent has
been the Council of Australian Govern-
ments, which was key to major policy
developments such as ESD.
These Australian responses cannot be
located entirely in the post-Brundtland or
post-Rio era, as they build upon and reflect
previous responses constructed before
“sustainable development” was adopted as
an overarching agenda, or fully articulated
as such (for a potted history, see Frawley
1994).  For example, much of what Land-
care “does” draws heavily on the accumu-
lated knowledge and practice of many
decades of the agronomic tradition of soil
conservation.  Integrated catchment man-
agement and regional resource manage-
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ment have similarly deep histories. The
Murray-Darling Basin Initiative in its
modern form was a product of the 1980s,
and dates to the formation of the River
Murray Commission eight decades ago.
The importance of historical context of
institutional and policy change is revisited
below.
Each country develops and favours a
particular mix of policy and institutional
responses, and Australia is no exception.
Some of the response categories above are
common to many countries, whereas others
are particularly Australian.  Likewise, other
countries may have embarked on quite
different pathways than Australia.  For
example, strategic, statutory planning has
not been a feature of the Australian experi-
ence recently; nor have the sort of detailed,
intergovernmental regulatory approaches
of the past decade in Europe.  This raises
the question, in a study such as this,
whether the focus should be on institu-
tional reform in countries that have done
similar things, or on countries that have
headed in policy and institutional direc-
tions unlike Australia’s.  There are obvious
benefits either way – to learn how to do
what we are doing better, or about things
we have not thought of doing – but to
choose one or other would perhaps be
efficient in terms of scoping this study.
Alternatively, this demarcation allows
explicit recognition of the quite different
basis for learning (accepting that the famil-
iar/unfamiliar demarcation is likely in
most cases to be a continuum).
DEFINING THE OBJECTS OF LEARNING   
Given the large number of factors and
their combinations that could characterise
policy and institutional responses to
sustainability, some categorisation is
required to simplify the task of choosing
case studies.  Here we use the typology of
policy learning outlined earlier to group
potential objects of learning.  As might be
expected, the least general examples are the
more numerous – individual instrument
types.  The more generally applicable
lessons are fewer in type and likely to be
scarce as documented examples – e.g. the
explicit reframing of policy problems
through normative acceptance of
sustainability principles.  However, we
must also remain cognisant of the systems
view of institutions presented above, which
emphasises the embedded and interde-
pendent nature of different elements of the
policy and institutional landscape.  This
means individual case studies may yield
lessons on several levels of the typology.
1. Implementation Instruments
Policy instruments are the policy tools
applied to deliver defined policy goals.
Bearing in mind the previous discussion of
potential multiple impacts of certain types
of instruments, including on policy goals,
instruments may be classified as:
• Coercive: such as statutory and regula-
tory proscription, prescription, standards
setting etc;
• Organisational: such as community
coordination and participatory ap-
proaches;
• Informational: including research,
education, SOE reporting, environmental
monitoring etc;
• Signalling and incentive: market and
pricing based approaches, taxes, levies,
user charges, subsidies etc;
Primary learners here would be govern-
ment agencies implementing policy to
which the case is relevant, and their
stakeholders;
Policy programs utilise more than one
instrument toward a more comprehensive
set of goals, in some coordinated fashion,
usually targeted at a substantive issue (eg.
salinity) or a resource sector (eg. fisheries).
The design of programs allows for greater
opportunity for building in the flexibility
required for most sustainability problems,
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given their complex nature and the uncer-
tainty of the effects of change.  Primary
learners would be strategic policy analysts
in relevant agencies, although specialists in
sustainability problems in this class are
somewhat thin on the ground.  The sophis-
tication of such design tasks begs a real
question here with regard to the sufficiency
of human capital and organisational con-
figuration in government to address
sustainability problems;
Policy processes involve mechanisms and
structures dedicated to policy formulation,
implementation design, and policy evalua-
tion and maintenance. Processes may be
ongoing, lengthy or of short duration.  In
areas where policy goals are evolving, and
uncertainty prevails with respect to the
current or future state of a resource and
impacts of its use – as is often the case with
sustainability issues – complex ongoing
process “rounds” are required to assess
new information and update policy set-
tings.
2. Organising Government
Organising and restructuring within gov-
ernment, where the structures and processes
within a tier of government are re-arranged
in some way to better meet a policy chal-
lenge, including such things as manage-
ment restructuring within agencies, inter-
departmental committees and portfolio
redesign, or involving the creation of new
or substantially altered organisa-
tions/agencies within the public sector, to
undertake new or revised administrative,
policy or information-related functions;
Intergovernmental structures and processes,
where sustainability problems are ad-
dressed through coordination between
different levels of government within a
country (eg. in a federal system), through
coordinated policy development, joint
standards, joint agencies, ministerial
councils, etc.;
Participatory processes, whether aimed at
on-ground management, monitoring,
policy formulation or policy monitoring
and evaluation.
3. Problem Reframing
Through normative change, where public
opinion, possibly assisted by government
sponsored processes, has demonstrably
shifted to redefine an existing sectoral issue
as a sustainability problem and has flowed
on into government policy;
Through legal change, mostly statutory but
possibly also involving the common law.
The law in this sense is viewed broadly,
including both regulatory policy in the
traditional sense, but more so the crucial
and often overlooked roles of statute law in
expressing social goals (eg. ESD principles),
creating process, creating organisational
structures, defining public access to deci-
sion making processes, etc.;
Through Parliamentary or executive gov-
ernment processes (e.g. like Senate Commit-
tees) that allow sustainability issues to be
treated in accordance with their attributes
and sustainability principles (eg. temporal
scale, integration, etc).
4. Political Advocacy
While relevant and important to the
raising of the sustainability policy agenda
in political fora, in the context of this
project we think such advocacy a difficult
target on its own.  It is likely that examples
will be picked up incidentally to studies in
the other target categories.  For example,
under organising government, the creation
of commissioners for the environment or
ESD, or the specification of advocacy roles
for agencies may prove worthwhile sub-
jects.
Clearly, these categories are not entirely
separate, and in any actual case of policy or
institutional reform of any significance,
more than one would be evident. Note that,
across all these types, an important variable
is the demonstrable or likely longevity of
the institutional or policy change.  This
applies both in terms of longevity and
persistence as positive attributes in
sustainability policy, but also the issue of
irreversibility and therefore possible
inflexibility of deeper policy and institu-
tional change.  Another important variable
is where a particular reform sits on the
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continuum between application or use of
existing policy or institutional settings or
capacities, and creation of substantially
new settings.
3. Filtering Cases and Lessons
Given that the potential pool of case
studies for a study such as this is immense,
the cases for more detailed (but still sum-
mary) analysis will need to be selected
carefully.  Among the factors that can
inform selection of cases in terms of their
relevance to Australia are:
• Ecological/biophysical similarities and
differences;
• Substantive issues that are relevant to
Australia, or are likely to be so;
• Socio-economic conditions in the case
location, compared to those in Australia;
• Formal and informal institutional con-
text;
• Political imperatives and policy styles
(see further below); and
• Resourcing requirements and availability
(human, financial, informational).
All such factors need to be assessed and
interpreted with cognisance of particular
historical contexts of institutional evolu-
tion.  A general principle linked closely to
the concept of an institutional ‘system’ is
path dependence.  Institutional possibilities
are historically defined – sudden creation is
possible but rare, and even sudden change
will be dependent on precedent conditions
(information, cultural context, legal prece-
dent, politcial norms built up over time).
Transfer of institutional models or ideas
therefore should be informed by the imme-
diately apparent suitability of the recipient
setting, but also by appreciation of how
that setting has evolved over time.
Further to these considerations, there is
the matter of deciding whether or not to
have a ‘sample’ of case studies or thematic
areas that cover all of, most of or a selected
small number of the variables discussed in
this paper.  These include: familiar or
unfamiliar (from an Australian perspective)
policy and institutional responses to sus-
tainable development, judged according to
what Australia has done so far or a more
extended typology of responses; simi-
lar/dissimilar countries; ESD principles;
and types of learning.  Clearly, not all can
be covered, so the basis of selection needs
careful thought.
Recognising the interdependent and
nested nature of the institutional system,
there may be cases of institutional reform
that are both apparently successful and
novel to Australia, but which on any
balanced analysis may be judged very
unlikely to be adopted in this country.
Institutional (and simpler organisational)
lessons, and the reforms they might lead to,
need to be analysed in the context of the
political and institutional setting into which
they are to be transplanted.  In the list of
prospective cases provided below, there are
some which may be, for this reason, judged
unlikely to inform actual change in Austra-
lia. For example, sustainable development
has been given constitutional recognition in
some countries, which would generally be
regarded as a significant institutional
change and in keeping with consistent but
unsuccessful calls for an environmental
head of power in the Australian constitu-
tion.  Leaving aside the eventual impact of
such a reform (flowing from the form of
expression and the existence of implemen-
tation mechanisms for constitutional law),
the history of constitutional reform in
Australia would indicate that such consti-
tutional expression would be most unlikely
here. Should we seek lessons from such
perhaps unlikely cases, or would closing
such options off be unwise?
The brief for this study stressed the need
to look at cases of “successful” institutional
reform.  Presumably this is intended to,
firstly, maximise positive and operational
lessons and, second, avoid the tendencies in
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the environmental and sustainability
literature to either be entirely critical and
negative, or to champion and advocate
single examples of institutional (or more
usually organisational) change.  While this
is a useful general tone to adopt, defining
“successful” raises some problems that can
be briefly noted here.
The success, effectiveness or worth of an
institutional or policy reform will be judged
differently by different groups and indi-
viduals.  For example, major components of
NRM policy in Australia in the past decade
– such as Landcare or the Regional Forest
Agreements process – have been judged
very positively and very negatively by
different observers and analysts.  One
criterion might be that widespread (but
rarely universal) acceptance or support
amongst the broader policy community
would indicate successful institutional
reform, at least in early years.  That high-
lights another problem: in many cases the
impact of policy and/or institutional
change in terms of positive improvement in
the state of the environment, human inter-
actions with it, or in the human condition
may take some time to become apparent.
Many possible cases of institutional reform
this study might focus on are only a few
years old, and thus “success” has yet to
become assessable.  In other cases this will
be less of a problem, such as where the
policy or institutional reform has as an aim
something that may emerge quickly, such
as creating an information stream by
including stakeholders in a process.  Such
strategies can be assessed with respect to
their procedural rationality and effective-
ness in achieving these short-term goals,
independently of the long-term substantive
outcomes.  Perhaps a useful distinction in
judging success is to separate process from
outcome. Finally, a case of institutional
reform is likely to have sub-components
that are more or less successful than others.
Indeed, because a multi-faceted institu-
tional reform may be brought undone by
one poor component, an institutional
experiment generally regarded as a failure
may provide valuable lessons in process or
structure.  These considerations are best
worked through at a case by case scale, but
this does raise the issue of how strictly (and
indeed just how) to interpret this part of the
brief.
Note that none of these factors rule out
particular kinds of cases or countries, but
rather may inform or qualify choice, and
will be important in both informing analy-
sis of selected cases and in qualifying and
contextualising any conclusions drawn.
SYNTHESISING: SCOPING CRITERIA   
As forewarned, this discussion of opera-
tionalising learning in the Australian
context has revealed the complexity that
underlies the attractive notion of ‘institu-
tional learning’.  To reduce the large range
of possible avenues of investigation to a
manageable level consistent with the tone
of the explanation of institutions and policy
learning given earlier, the following pro-
poses primary criteria for selecting case
studies and thematic areas for further
exploration in this study.  These are or-
dered according to the various implicit and
explicit criteria in the sequence they are
dealt with in this paper:
1. What ‘parts’ of the institutional system?
It is proposed that, in terms of a hierar-
chical understanding of institutional
systems, focus would best be placed on
cases involving higher-order institutional
change, where there is evidence of credible
commitment by governments to sustainable
development principles.  This would
involve change at statutory level and/or in
structures and processes that have trans-
formative impacts on the way policy and
management is carried out.  This emphasis
is chosen in preference to seeking out
examples of change happening primarily at
the program implementation level.  Having
said that, the most fundamental and radical
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forms of institutional change (revolutionary
refashioning) would not be a sensible focus
given the practical intent of the study.
2. What type of learning?
It is proposed that the focus be on more
significant forms of government learning
and on social learning, in keeping with (1)
above. Instrumental and political learning
may become an incidental topic in some
cases through this focus, but would not be
sought as a primary target for analysis.
3. What ESD principles to explore? And,
what attributes of sustainability problems?
The five ESD principles (from Box 1)
with the greatest generic and institutional
relevance in terms of (1) and (2) above are:
sustainable economic development; inte-
gration; the precautionary principle; policy
instrument choice; and community in-
volvement.12 These can be reshaped to
capture deeper properties of sustainability
issues and ESD principles, and the spirit of
the institutional approach so as to provide
a set of targets that may connect with non-
Australian responses to the SD agenda:
• Integration of social, environmental and
economic policy and goals;
• Handling of pervasive uncertainty;
• The deep embedding of SD principles in
the institutional system, evidencing
credible commitment to the long term;
• The links between credible commitment
to SD, property rights instruments, and
problem reframing;
                                                
12 While important, it is proposed that the ESD
principles of international policy and competitive-
ness not be a focus, as this would require a massive
and impossible widening of the project to consider
issues of development aid, trade policy, and treaty
negotiation and implementation.
• Community participation in the above
(as opposed to program delivery through
community based groups not involving
deeper or more lasting institutional
change).
4. What objects of learning?
It is proposed that the study focuses on
the following parts of the typology pre-
sented earlier:
• Substantial policy processes targeting
elements of (2) and (3) above;
• Organising government (restructuring,
intergovernmental, participatory), where
the reorganisation involves significant
and ongoing refocusing of policy activ-
ity, information flows, participation, etc;
and
• Problem reframing (normative and legal
change, parliamentary or executive gov-
ernment processes).
Thus, implementation instruments and
policy programs would not be a focus, with
the exception of instrument classes with the
intent or potential to affect (2) and (3)
above; that is, significant legislative change,
transformative rights instruments, and
some educational instruments (dealing
with reframing the problem rather than
specific issues).
This narrows the criteria set to a man-
ageable level, but certainly still allows more
than ample scope. An additional and
important criterion in selecting particular
case studies of institutional change, is the
availability of sufficient existing data and
analysis, given the impossibility of this
study to engage in substantial primary data
gathering. The ‘filters’ for considering cases
from other countries, discussed above,
would be applied at a finer level to case
study selection, and utilised to qualify
institutional lessons that might emerge
from analysis.
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4. Possible Cases for Exploration
Utilising the above criteria, this section
proposes a range of potential case studies
and thematic areas that could be examined
in this study.  The options in the selection
below are all viable as targets for investiga-
tion and analysis, and it is noted how they
address the criteria – in most cases more
than one criterion. The following options
are considered viable and relevant, but
other options are not ruled out.  The fol-
lowing options are divided into two
groupings, firstly those most favoured, and
secondly those that would be appropriate
but at present not highly favoured.  The
basis for this division, referring to the
scoping criteria above, are provided for
each.
The currently favoured options for
further analysis are:
• New Zealand’s Resource Management
Act, as a major statutory reform in response
to sustainability, organised in part on a
regional basis, with significant participa-
tion by varied policy and epistemic com-
munities and well-described in the litera-
ture.  As a focus for case study this legisla-
tion and its implementation could provide
lessons at various levels from devolution of
environmental management through
nested policy hierarchies, catchment based
regionalisation of NRM responsibility
(structural logic), to consultative develop-
ment of policy and legislation.  The RMA
presents the most well-documented at-
tempt to move from traditional planning
schemes toward planning for sustainability.
Existing literature containing comparative
analysis may allow some extension of this
case study toward recognition of similar or
contrasting reforms in other countries.
• The institutional context and social,
environmental and economic implications
of creating and maintaining rights markets
in natural resources. This would be done
via an examination of Individual Transfer-
able Quota in fisheries in different coun-
tries.  Water rights may be a more obvious
choice for Australian relevance, but ITQ
have been in place longer and have been
subject to recent and wide-ranging reviews.
Water markets will thus be treated as an
adjunct topic to the more tractable fisheries
domain.  This option addresses a transfor-
mative instrument, property rights issues,
integration of social, economic and envi-
ronmental dimensions, and the stated
Australian preference for market-based
mechanisms;
• Actual and proposed strategic environ-
mental assessment (SEA) processes and
proposals for integrated assessment (IA) in
different jurisdictions as responses aimed at
extending the tradition of environmental
impact assessment beyond discrete projects
and onto non-environmental policies, plans
and programs (including consideration of
related approaches such as integrated
assessment or technology assessment).
Depending on particulars and implemen-
tation, etc., this addresses integration,
whole-of-government mechanisms, and
policy rights and responsibilities.
• National councils for sustainable devel-
opment and equivalent bodies, now estab-
lished in dozens of countries, as national
level, inclusive policy advisory and educa-
tional responses addressing (potentially)
integration, long term policy making,
reorganising government and participation.
In particular, this theme allows investiga-
tion into possible models for whole-of-
government/cross-sectoral mechanisms for
furthering ESD.
• Institutional and especially regulatory
and policy integration in the European
community in environmental policy and
standards across national boundaries, as
the most significant example of trans-
boundary, detailed mixed regulatory-self
regulatory approaches in the world at
present.
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• Statutory expression of sustainable
development principles in different juris-
dictions (largely those comparable in
political and legal traditions to Australia),
in terms of the extent to which expression
can or has influenced the institutional and
policy system and decisions made within it.
This would of necessity include considera-
tion of implementation of treaties and
agreements, specifically the Rio-related set
of instruments. This addresses problem
reframing, integration, whole-of-
government impact, and legal change.
Cases and themes at present less fa-
voured are (noting that some observations
on such options may be possible if material
is considered while investigation the options
above):
• Constitutional expression of
sustainability principles.  As discussed
earlier, this appears an unlikely prospect in
Australia, and it is noted that recent major
constitutional reform for other reasons
appears to be the key reason for such
expressions in those few countries that
have given sustainability such status.
• Implementation of national sustainable
development strategies in other countries,
where comparable with Australia’s NESD
and where, at least in intent, the strategies
are whole-of-government.  While attractive,
this would demand detailed and repeated
analysis of specific national policy making
contexts, beyond the scope of this project.
• Parliamentary or executive government
processes whereby bi- or multi-partisan
agreements on policy directions are devel-
oped, removing some aspects of
sustainability problems from rapid and
perhaps unthinking change following
elections or changes in political fashion
(nevertheless accepting the rights of gov-
ernments to make and change policy and
priorities).  Again, while attractive this
would demand detailed understanding of
the political context in a range of countries.
• Implementation of international instru-
ments, focusing on inclusiveness of proc-
esses (community, and within federal
systems), translation of principles to do-
mestic law and policy, and monitoring of
implementation.  While the impact of
especially the Rio set of instruments is a
significant issue, this would require consid-
erable effort, and the lessons generated
may be of limited transferability across
legal systems.  The favoured option of
examining statutory expression of
sustainability principles would offer some
insight into this.
• Participatory policy and management
processes (not specific programs) that
enable lasting and/or significant transfer of
power to stakeholder groups, to provide a
contrast to Australia’s investment in this
response type (including indigenous land
management and co-management of areas
or resources).  This addresses participation
and reorganising government.  This would
require substantial research and scoping to
select particular cases, given the great
number and fine scale of most cases.  Also,
it is probably the case that participatory
arrangements, both in Australia and else-
where, have received more attention than
other options, given their prominence in
practice and in research in recent years, and
efforts would best be directed elsewhere.
• State of environment reporting in a
sample of jurisdictions, emphasising the
institutional setting for SoE and the institu-
tionalisation of linkages between the
reporting process, long term environmental
and policy monitoring, and policy formu-
lation.  SoE is but one science-policy-
communication mechanism in the ESD
field, and examined alone may be of little
interest in the absence of consideration of
other mechanisms (resource accounting,
corporate reporting, etc).  However, a
fuller, comparative examination of science-
policy-community information transfers
would be a large task. To be effective, it
would also require assessment of the
impact of SoE systems, as opposed to the
production of reports, and while an issue
deserving of close attention this would be
beyond the scope of this project.
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Despite its prominence in Australia, river
basin governance and integrated catchment
management are not proposed as cases,
given the mass of previous work that has
been undertaken and that currently being
undertaken through the Murray-Darling
Basin Commission.
The favoured six options are considered
to offer a balance between sufficiently well-
defined avenues of inquiry, and the need to
consider a range of kinds and degrees of
institutional change, and in particular the
constraints and opportunities to be found
within the institutional systems in which
these reforms have taken place.  In this
way, it is the intention of this project to not
simply or even primarily document these
cases, but to utilise them as vehicles for
increasing the sophistication and opera-
tional usefulness of Australian discussions
of institutional change for ESD.
5. Conclusion
This working paper has benefited from input from the project steering committee,13 and
sets the direction for the second phase of the project.  As well as being an outcome of the
project – especially the conceptual background in Part 1 – the paper will be used to com-
municate the nature and scope of the project to potential collaborating researchers and
groups.  The next phase of research from 12/2001 to 8/2002 will involve more detailed
investigation into the cases and themes of institutional change proposed above and the
institutional systems within which they are embedded, and analysis and lesson-drawing
for the Australian context.
                                                
13 Dr Catherine Mobbs and Mr Ken Moore of Land and Water Australia, Professor John Handmer of the Risk
and Community Safety Research Initiative, Ms Rosemary Purdie of the Murray Darling Basin Commission,
and Dr Lorraine Elliott of the Australian National University.
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